widely recognized, with some justice, that answering the what and the how questions in a chronological fashion, even if directed by a central argument, does not in fact go very far towards answering the why questions. Moreover historians were at that time strongly under the influence of both Marxist ideology and social science methodology. As a result they were interested in societies not individuals, and were confident that a "scientific history" could be achieved which would in time produce generalized laws to explain historical change.
Here we must pause again to define what is meant by "scientific history". The first "scientific history" was formulated by Ranke in the nineteenth century and was based on the study of new source materials. It was assumed that close textual criticism of hitherto undisclosed records buried in state archives would once and for all establish the facts of political history. In the last thirty years there have been three very different kinds of "scientific history" current in the profession, all based not on new data, but on new models or new methods: they are the Marxist economic model, the French ecological/demographic model, and the American "cliometric" methodology. According to the old Marxist model, history moves in a dialectical process of thesis and antithesis, through a clash of classes which are themselves created by changes in control over the means of production. In the 1930S this idea resulted in a fairly simplistic economic/social determinism which affected many young scholars of the time. It was a notion of "scientific history" which was strongly defended by Marxists up to the late 1950S. It should, however, be noted that the current generation of "neo-Marxists" seems to have abandoned most of the basic tenets of the traditional Marxist historians of the 1930S. They are now as concerned with the state, politics, religion and ideology as their non-Marxist colleagues, and in the process appear to have dropped the claim to be pursuing "scientific history".
The second meaning of "scientific history" is that used since I945 by the Annales school of French historians, of whom Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie may stand as a spokesman, albeit a rather extreme one. According to him, the key variable in history is shifts in the ecological balance between food supplies and population, a balance necessarily to be determined by long-term quantitative studies of agricultural productivity, demographic changes and food prices. This kind of "scientific history" emerged from a combination of long-standing French interest in historical geography and historical demography, coupled with the methodology of quantification. Le Roy Ladurie told us bluntly that "history that is not quantifiable cannot claim to be scientific".3
The third meaning of "scientific history" is primarily American, and is based on the claim, loudly and clearly expressed by the "cliometricians", that only their own very special quantitative methodology has any claim to be scientific.4 According to them the historical community can be divided into two. There are "the traditionalists", who include both the old-style narrative historians dealing mainly with state politics and constitutional history, as well as the "new" economic and demographic historians of the Annales and Past and Present schools -despite the fact that the latter use quantification and that for several decades the two groups were bitter enemies, especially in France. Quite separate are the "scientific historians", the cliometricians, who are defined by a methodology rather than by any particular subject-matter or interpretation of the nature of historical change. They are historians who build paradigmatic models, sometimes counter-factual ones about worlds which never existed in real life, and who test the validity of the models by the most sophisticated mathematical and algebraical formulae applied to very large quantities of electronically processed data. Their special field is economic history, which they have virtually conquered in the United States, and they have made large inroads into the history of recent democratic politics by applying their methods to voting behaviour, both of the electorate and the elected. These great enterprises are necessarily the result of team-work, rather like the building of the pyramids: squads of diligent assistants assemble data, encode it, programme it, and pass it through the maw of the computer, all under the autocratic direction of a team-leader. The results cannot be tested by any of the traditional methods since the evidence is buried in private computer-tapes, not exposed in published footnotes. In any case the data are often expressed in so mathematically recondite a form that they are unintelligible to the majority of the historical profession. The only reassurance to the bemused laity is that the members of this priestly order disagree fiercely and publicly about the validity of each other's findings.
These three types of "scientific history" overlap to some degree, but they are sufficiently distinct, certainly in the eyes of their practitioners, to justify the creation of this tripartite typology.
Other "scientific" explanations of historical change have risen to favour for a while and then gone out of fashion. French structuralism produced some brilliant theorizing, but no single major work of history -unless one considers Michel Foucault's writings as primarily works of history, rather than of moral philosophy with examples drawn from history. Parsonian functionalism, which itself 4An unpublished paper by R. W. Fogel, "Scientific History and Traditional History" (1979), offers the most persuasive case that can be mustered for regarding this as the one and only truly "scientific" history. But I remain unconvinced.
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was preceded by Malinowski's Scientific Theory of Culture,5 had a long run, despite its failure to offer an explanation of change over time and the obvious fact that the fit between the material and biological needs of a society and the institutions and values by which it lives has always been less than perfect, and often very poor indeed. Both structuralism and functionalism have provided valuable insights, but neither has come even near to supplying historians with an allembracing scientific explanation of historical change. All the three main groups of "scientific historians", which flourished respectively from the I930S until the I950s, the I950s to midI970s, and in the 96os and early I970s, were supremely confident that the major problems of historical explanation were soluble, and that they would, given time, succeed in solving them. Cast-iron solutions would, they assumed, eventually be provided for such hitherto baffling questions as the causes of "great revolutions" or the shifts from feudalism to capitalism, and from traditional to modern societies. This heady optimism, which was so apparent from the 930S to the I96os, was buttressed among the first two groups of "scientific historians" by the belief that material conditions such as changes in the relationship between population and food supply, changes in the means of production and class conflict, were the driving forces in history. Many, but not all, regarded intellectual, cultural, religious, psychological, legal, even political, developments as mere epiphenomena. Since economic and/or demographic determinism largely dictated the content of the new genre of historical research, the analytic rather than the narrative mode was best suited to organize and present the data, and the data themselves had as far as possible to be quantitative in nature. The French historians, who in the I 95os and i 96os were in the lead in this brave enterprise, developed a standard hierarchical arrangement: first, both in place and in order of importance, came the economic and demographic facts; then the social structure; and lastly, intellectual, religious, cultural and political developments. These three tiers were thought of like the storeys of a house: each rests on the foundation of the one below, but those above can have little or no reciprocal effect on those underneath. In some hands the new methodology and new questions produced results which were little short of sensational. The first books of Fernand Braudel, Pierre Goubert and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie will rank among the greatest historical writings of any time and place.6 They alone fully justify the adoption for a generation of the analytical and structural approach. The conclusion, however, was historical revisionism with a vengeance. Since only the first tier really mattered, and since the subjectmatter was the material conditions of the masses, not the culture of the elite, it became possible to talk about the history of Continental Europe from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries as "l'histoire immobile". Le Roy Ladurie argued that nothing, absolutely nothing, changed over those five centuries, since the society remained obstinately imprisoned in its traditional and unaltered "eco-demographie".7 In this new model of history such movements as the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the rise of the modern state simply disappeared. Ignored were the massive transformations of culture, art, architecture, literature, religion, education, science, law, constitution, state-building, bureaucracy, military organization, fiscal arrangements, and so on, which took place among the higher echelons of society in those five centuries. This curious blindness was the result of a firm belief that these matters were all parts of the third tier, a mere superficial superstructure. When, recently, some scholars from this school began to use their well-tried statistical methods on such problems as literacy, the contents of libraries and the rise and fall of Christian piety, they described their activities as the application of quantification to "le troisieme niveau".
III
The first cause of the current revival of narrative is a widespread disillusionment with the economic determinist model of historical explanation and this three-tiered hierarchical arrangement to which it gave rise. The split between social history on the one hand and intellectual history on the other has had the most unfortunate consequences. Both have become isolated, inward-looking, and narrow. In America intellectual history, which had once been the flagship of the profession, fell upon hard times and for a while lost confidence in itself;8 social history has flourished as never before, but its pride in its isolated achievements was but the harbinger of an eventual decline in vitality, when faith in purely economic and social explanations began to ebb. The historical record has now obliged many of us to admit that there is an extraordinarily complex two-way flow of interactions between facts of population, food supply, climate, bullion supply, prices, on the one hand, and values, ideas and customs on the other. Along with social relationships of status or class, they form a single web of meaning.
Many historians now believe that the culture of the group, and even the will of the individual, are potentially at least as important causal agents of change as the impersonal forces of material output and demographic growth. There is no theoretical reason why the latter should always dictate the former, rather than vice versa, and indeed evidence is piling up of examples to the contrary.9 Contraception, for example, is clearly as much a product of a state of mind as it is of economic circumstances. The proof of this contention can be found in the wide diffusion of this practice throughout France, long before industrialization, without much population pressure except on small farms, and nearly a century before any other western country. We also now know that the nuclear family antedated industrial society, and that concepts of privacy, love and individualism similarly emerged among some of the most traditional sectors of a traditional society in late seventeenth-and early eighteenth-century England, rather than as a result of later modernizing economic and social processes. The Puritan ethic was a by-product of an unworldly religious movement which took root in the Anglo-Saxon societies of England and New England centuries before routine work-patterns were necessary or the first factory was built. On the other hand there is an inverse correlation, at any rate in nineteenth-century France, between literacy and urbanization and industrialization. Levels of literacy turn out to be a poor guide to "modern" attitudes of mind or "modern" occupations.10 Thus the linkages between culture and society are clearly very complex indeed, and seem to vary from time to time and from place to place.
It is hard not to suspect that the decline of ideological commitment among western intellectuals has also played its part. If one looks at three of the most passionate and hard-fought historical battles of the I950S and I96os -about the rise or decline of the gentry in seventeenth-century England, about the rise or fall of working-class real income in the early stages of industrialization, and about the causes, nature and consequences of American slavery -all were at bottom debates fired by current ideological concerns. It seemed desperately important at the time to know whether or not the Marxist interpretation was right, and therefore these historical questions mattered and were exciting. The muting of ideological controversy caused by the intellectual decline of Marxism and the adoption of mixed economies in the west has coincided with a decline in the thrust of historical research to ask the big why questions, and it is plausible to suggest that there is some relationship between the two trends.
Economic and demographic determinism has not only been undermined by a recognition of ideas, culture and even individual will as independent variables. It has also been sapped by a revived recognition that political and military power, the use of brute force, has very frequently dictated the structure of the society, the distribution of wealth, the agrarian system, and even the culture of the elite. Classic examples are the Norman conquest of England in o66, and probably also the divergent economic and social paths taken by eastern Europe, north-western Europe and England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.1 Future historians will undoubtedly severely criticize the "new historians" of the 195os and i96os for their failure to take sufficient account of power: of political organization and decisionmaking and the vagaries of military battle and siege, destruction and conquest. Civilizations have risen and fallen due to fluctuations in political authority and shifts in the fortunes of war, and it is extraordinary that these matters should have been neglected for so long by those who regarded themselves as in the forefront of the historical profession. In practice the bulk of the profession continued to concern itself with political history, just as it had always done, but this is not where the cutting edge of the profession was generally thought to be. A belated recognition of the importance of power, of personal political decisions by individuals, of the chances of battle, have forced historians back to the narrative mode, whether they like it or not. To use Machiavelli's terms, neither virtu nor fortuna can be dealt with except by a narrative, or even an anecdote, since the first is an individual attribute and the second a happy or unhappy accident.
The third development which has dealt a serious blow to structural and analytical history is the mixed record to date in the use of what has been its most characteristic methodology -namely quantification. Quantification has undoubtedly matured and has now established itself as an essential methodology in many areas of historical inquiry, especially demographic history, the history of social structure and social mobility, economic history, and the history of voting patterns and voting behaviour in democratic political systems. Its use has greatly improved the general quality of historical discourse, by demanding the citation of precise numbers instead of the previous loose use of words. Historians can no longer get away with saying "more", "less", "growing", "declining", all of which logically imply numerical comparisons, without ever stating explicitly the statistical basis for their assertions. It has also made argument exclusively by example seem somewhat disreputable. Critics now demand supporting statistical evidence to show that the examples are typical, and not 
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PAST AND PRESENT exceptions to the rule. These procedures have undoubtedly improved the logical power and persuasiveness of historical argument. Nor is there any disagreement that whenever it is appropriate, fruitful and possible from the surviving records, the historian should count. There is, however, a difference in kind between the artisan quantification done by a single researcher totting up figures on a handcalculator and producing simple tables and percentages, and the work of the cliometricians. The latter specialize in the assembling of vast quantities of data by teams of assistants, the use of the electronic computer to process it all, and the application of highly sophisticated mathematical procedures to the results obtained. Doubts have been cast on all stages of this procedure. Many question whether historical data are ever sufficiently reliable to warrant such procedures; whether teams of assistants can be trusted to apply uniform coding procedures to large quantities of often widely diverse and even ambiguous documents; whether much crucial detail is not lost in the coding procedure; if it is ever possible to be confident that all coding and programming errors have been eliminated; and whether the sophistication of the mathematical and algebraic formulae are not ultimately self-defeating since they baffle most historians. Finally, many are disturbed by the virtual impossibility of checking up on the reliability of the final results, since they must depend not on published footnotes but on privately owned computer-tapes, in turn the result of thousands of privately owned code-sheets, in turn abstracted from the raw data.
These questions are real and will not go away. We all know of doctoral dissertations or printed papers or monographs which have used the most sophisticated techniques either to prove the obvious or to claim to prove the implausible, using formulae and language which render the methodology unverifiable to the ordinary historian. The results sometimes combine the vices ofunreadability and triviality. We all know of the doctoral dissertations which languish unfinished since the researcher has been unable to keep under intellectual control the sheer volume of print-out spewed out by the computer, or has spent so much effort preparing the data for the machine that his time, patience and money have run out. One clear conclusion is surely that, whenever possible, sampling by hand is preferable and quicker than, and just as reliable as, running the whole universe through a machine. We all know of projects in which a logical flaw in the argument or a failure to use plain common sense has vitiated or cast in doubt many of the conclusions. We all know of other projects in which the failure to record one piece of information at the coding stage has led to the loss of an important result. We all know of others where the sources of information are themselves so unreliable that we can be sure that little confidence can be placed in the conclusions based on their quantitative manipulation. Parish registers are a classic example, upon which a gigantic amount of effort is currently being spent in many countries, only some of which is likely to produce worthwhile results.
Despite its unquestionable achievements it cannot be denied that quantification has not fulfilled the high hopes of twenty years ago. Most of the great problems of history remain as insoluble as ever, if not more so. Consensus on the causes of the English, French or American revolutions are as far away as ever, despite the enormous effort put into elucidating their social and economic origins. Thirty years of intensive research on demographic history has left us more rather than less bewildered. We do not know why the population ceased to grow in most areas of Europe between 1640 and 1740; we do not know why it began to grow again in i740; or even whether the cause was rising fertility or declining mortality. Quantification has told us a lot about the what questions of historical demography, but relatively little so far about the why. The major questions about American slavery remain as elusive as ever, despite the application to them of one of the most massive and sophisticated studies ever mounted. The publication of its findings, far from solving most problems, merely raised the temperature of the debate.12 It had the beneficial effect of focusing attention on important issues such as the diet, hygiene, health and family structure of American Negroes under slavery, but it also diverted attention from the equally or even more important psychological effects of slavery upon both masters and slaves, simply because these matters could not be measured by a computer. Urban histories are cluttered with statistics, but mobility trends still remain obscure. Today no one is quite sure whether English society was more open and mobile than the French in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or even whether the gentry or aristocracy was rising or falling in England before the Civil War. We are no better off now in these respects than were James Harrington in the seventeenth century or Tocqueville in the nineteenth.
It is just those projects that have been the most lavishly funded, the most ambitious in the assembly of vast quantities of data by armies of paid researchers, the most scientifically processed by the very latest in computer technology, the most mathematically sophisticated in presentation, which have so far turned out to be the most disappointing. Today, two decades and millions of dollars, pounds and francs later, there are only rather modest results to show for the expenditure of so much time, effort and money. There are huge piles of greenish printout gathering dust in scholars' offices; there are many turgid and excruciatingly dull tomes full of tables of figures, abstruse algebraic equations and percentages given to two decimal places. There are also many valuable new findings and a few major contributions to the relatively small corpus of historical works of permanent value. But in general the sophistication of the methodology has tended to exceed the reliability of the data, while the usefulness of the results seems-up to a point -to be in inverse correlation to the mathematical complexity of the methodology and the grandiose scale of data-collection.
On any cost-benefit analysis the rewards of large-scale computerized history have so far only occasionally justified the input of time and money and this has led historians to cast around for other methods of investigating the past, which will shed more light with less trouble. In I968 Le Roy Ladurie prophesied that by the I98os "the historian will be a programmer or he will be nothing".13 The prophecy has not been fulfilled, least of all by the prophet himself.
Historians A significant sub-group of the great French school of historians, led by Lucien Febvre, has always regarded intellectual, psychological and cultural changes as independent variables of central importance. But for a long time they were in a minority, left behind in a remote backwater as the flood-tide of "scientific history", economic and social in content, structural in organization and quantitative in methodology, swept past them. Now, however, the topics they were interested in have quite suddenly become fashionable. The questions asked, however, are not quite the same as they used to be, since they are now often drawn from anthropology. In practice, if not in theory, anthropology has tended to be one of the most ahistorical of disciplines in its lack of interest in change over time. None the less it has taught us how a whole social system and set of values can be brilliantly illuminated by the searchlight method of recording in elaborate detail a single event, provided that it is very carefully set in its total context and very carefully analysed for its cultural meaning. The archetypal model of this "thick description" is Clifford Geertz's classic account of a Balinese cock-fight.14 We historians cannot, alas, actually be present, with notebooks, tape-recorders and cameras, at the events we describe, but now and again we can find a One further reason why a number of "new historians" are turning back to narrative seems to be a desire to make their findings accessible once more to an intelligent but not expert reading public, which is eager to learn what these innovative new questions, methods and data have revealed, but cannot stomach indigestible statistical tables, dry analytical argument, and jargon-ridden prose. Increasingly the structural, analytical, quantitative historians have found themselves talking to each other and no one else. Their findings have appeared in professional journals, or in monographs so expensive and with such small print runs (under a thousand) that they have been in practice almost entirely bought by libraries. And yet the success of popular historical periodicals like History Today and L'histoire proves that there is a large audience ready to listen, and the "new historians" are now anxious to speak to that audience, rather than leaving it to be fed on the pabulum of popular biographies and textbooks. The questions being asked by the "new historians" are, after all, those which preoccupy us all today: the nature of power, authority and charismatic leadership; the relation of political institutions to underlying social patterns and value systems; attitudes to youth, old age, disease and death; sex, marriage and concubinage; birth, contraception and abortion; work, leisure and conspicuous consumption; the relationship of religion, science and magic as explanatory models of reality; the strength and direction of the emotions of love, fear, lust and hate; the impact of literacy and education upon people's lives and ways of looking at the world; the relative importance attached to different social groupings, such as the family, kin, community, nation, class and race; the strength and meaning of ritual, symbol and custom as ways of binding a community together; moral and philosophical approaches to crime and punishment; patterns of deference and outbursts of egalitarianism; structural conflicts between status groups or classes; the means, possibilities and limitations of social mobility; the nature and significance of popular protest and millenarian hopes; the shifting ecological balance between man and nature; the causes and effects of disease. All these are burning issues at the moment and are concerned with the masses rather than the elite. They are more "relevant" to our own lives than the doings of dead kings, presidents and generals. The adoption by the historians of mentalite of minute descriptive narrative or individual biography is not, however, without its problems. The trouble is the old one, that argument by selective example is philosophically unpersuasive, a rhetorical device not a scientific proof. The basic historiographical trap in which we are ensnared has recently been well set out by Carlo Ginzburg: "The quantitative and anti-anthropocentric approach of the sciences of nature from Galileo onwards has placed human sciences in an unpleasant dilemma: they must either adopt a weak scientific standard so as to be able to attain significant results, or adopt a strong scientific standard to attain results of no great importance".41 Disappointment with the second approach is causing a drift back to the first. As a result what is now taking place is an expansion of the selective examplenow often a detailed unique example -into one of the fashionable modes of historical writing. In one sense this is only a logical extension of the enormous success of local history studies, which have taken as their subject not a whole society but only a segment -a province, a town, even a village. Total history only seems possible if one takes a microcosm, and the results have often done more to illuminate and explain the past than all the earlier or concurrent studies based on the archives of the central government. In another sense, however, the new trend is the antithesis of local history studies, since it abandons the total history of a society, however small, as an impossibility, and settles for the story of a single cell.
The second problem which arises from the use of the detailed example to illustrate mentalite is how to distinguish the normal from the eccentric. Since man is now our quarry, the narration of a very detailed story of a single incident or personality can make both good reading and good sense. But this will be so only if the stories do not merely tell a striking but fundamentally irrelevant tale of some dramatic episode of riot or rape, or the life of some eccentric rogue or villain or mystic, but are selected for the light they can throw upon certain aspects of a past culture. This means that they must be typical, and yet the wide use of records of litigation makes this question of typicality very difficult to resolve. People hauled into court are almost by definition atypical, but the world that is so nakedly exposed in the testimony of witnesses need not be so. Safety therefore lies in examining the documents not so much for their evidence about the eccentric behaviour of the accused as for the light they shed on the life and opinions of those who happened to get involved in the incident in question.
The third problem concerns interpretation, and is even harder to resolve. Provided the historian remains aware of the hazards involved, story-telling is perhaps as good a way as any to obtain an intimate glimpse of man in the past, to try to get inside his head. The trouble is that if he succeeds in getting there, the narrator will need all the skill and experience and knowledge acquired in the practice of analytical history of society, economy and culture, if he is to provide a plausible explanation of some of the very strange things he is liable to find. He may also need a little amateur psychology to help him along, but amateur psychology is extremely tricky material to handle successfully -and some would argue that it is impossible. Another obvious danger is that the revival of narrative may lead to a return to pure antiquarianism, to story-telling for its own sake. Yet another is that it will focus attention upon the sensational and so obscure the dullness and drabness In 1972 Le Roy Ladurie wrote confidently: "Present-day historiography, with its preference for the quantifiable, the statistical and the structural, has been obliged to suppress in order to survive. In the last decades it has virtually condemned to death the narrative history of events and the individual biography".42 It is far too early to pronounce a funeral oration over the decaying corpse of analytical, structural, quantitative history, which continues to flourish, and even to grow if the trend in American doctoral dissertations is any guide.43 Nevertheless in this, the third decade, narrative history and individual biography are showing evident signs of rising again from the dead. Neither look quite the same as they used to do before their alleged demise, but they are easily identifiable as variants of the same genus.
It is clear that a single word like "narrative", especially one with such a complicated history behind it, is inadequate to describe what is in fact a broad cluster of changes in the nature of historical discourse. There are signs of change with regard to the central issue in history, from the circumstances surrounding man, to man in circumstances; in the problems studied, from the economic and demographic to the cultural and emotional; in the prime sources of influence, from sociology, economics and demography to anthropology and psychology; in the subject-matter, from the group to the individual; in the 42 Further details will be available in subsequent issues.
